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Abstract
Using the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL we have formalized and proved correct and executable
bytecode veri!er in the style of Kildall’s algorithm for a signi!cant subset of the Java Virtual
Machine (JVM). First an abstract framework for proving correctness of data 7ow based type
inference algorithms for assembly languages is formalized. It is shown that under certain con-
ditions Kildall’s algorithm yields a correct bytecode veri!er. Then the framework is instantiated
with our previous work about the JVM. Finally, we demonstrate the 7exibility of the frame-
work by extending our previous JVM model and the executable bytecode veri!er with object
initialization.
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1. Introduction
Over the past few years there has been considerable interest in formal models for Java
and the Java Virtual Machine (JVM), and in particular its bytecode veri!er (BCV).
So far most of the work has concentrated on abstract models of particularly tricky
aspects of the JVM, speci!cally object initialization and the idiosyncratic notion of
“subroutines”. This paper complements those studies by focussing on machine-checked
proofs of executable models. Its distinctive features are:
• The !rst machine-checked proof of correctness of a BCV implementation for a non-
trivial subset of the JVM (including some of the tricky aspects mentioned above).
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• The BCV is an almost directly executable functional program (which can be gen-
erated automatically from its Isabelle=HOL formalization). The few non-executable
constructs (some choice functions) are easily implemented.
• The work is modular: the BCV (and its correctness proof!) becomes a simple instance
of a general framework for data 7ow analysis.
• Almost all details of the model are presented. The complete formalization, including
proofs, is available via the authors’ home page.
Thus the novelty is not in the actual mathematics but in setting up a framework that
matches the needs of the JVM, instantiating it with a description of the JVM, and
doing this in complete detail, down to an executable program, and including all the
proofs.
Moreover this is not an isolated development but it is integrated directly with the
existing formalizations of Java and the JVM in Isabelle=HOL [18–20]. From them it
also inherits the absence of subroutines and exception handling. Object initialization
was not treated in [18–20] either; we will introduce this new feature here, and show
how the framework deals with extensions.
Although our only application is the JVM, our modular framework is in principle
applicable to other “typed assembly languages” such as MSIL [12] as well; hence the
plural in the title.
What does the BCV do and what does it guarantee? The literature already contains
a number of (partial) answers to this question. We follow the type system approach of
Stata, Abadi and others [24,9,10,21,13,23]. The type systems check a program w.r.t.
additional type annotations that provide the missing typing of storage locations for
each instruction. These type systems are then shown to guarantee type soundness, i.e.
absence of type errors during execution (which was veri!ed formally by Pusch [20]
for a subset of the system by Qian [21]). Only Qian [22] proves the correctness of an
algorithm for turning his type checking rules into a data 7ow analyzer. However, his
algorithm is still quite abstract.
Closely related is the work by Goldberg [11] who rephrases and generalizes the
overly concrete description of the BCV given in [15] as an instance of a generic data
7ow framework. Work towards a veri!ed implementation in the SPECWARE system is
sketched by Coglio et al. [7]. Although we share the lattice-theoretic foundations with
this work and it appears to consider roughly the same instruction set, it is otherwise
quite diQerent: whereas we solve the data 7ow problem directly, they generate con-
straints to be solved separately, which is not described. Furthermore, they state desired
properties axiomatically but do not prove them. Using the B method, Casset [6] speci-
!es a bytecode veri!er for the JavaCard VM, which he then re!nes into an executable
program that provably satis!es the speci!cation. He does not show type safety. Based
on the work of Freund and Mitchell [9] and Bertot [5] has recently used the Coq
system to prove the correctness of a BCV that handles object initialization, but again
without classes. Barthe et al. [2,3] also use the Coq system; they cover the complete
instruction set of the JavaCard platform, but do not handle object initialization.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The basic datatypes and semilattices
required for data 7ow analysis are introduced in Section 2. Our abstract framework
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relating type systems, data 7ow analysis, and bytecode veri!cation is set up in Sec-
tion 3. It is proved that under certain conditions bytecode veri!cation determines well-
typedness. We also show that Kildall’s algorithm, an iterative data 7ow analysis, is
a BCV. In Section 4, the results of the previous sections are used to derive a BCV
for the existing Java formalization. Finally, in Section 5 we add the object initializa-
tion feature to the Java BCV, show how to integrate it with Kildall’s algorithm, and
discuss its soundness.
2. Types, orders, and semilattices
This section introduces the basic mathematical concepts and their formalization in
Isabelle=HOL. Note that HOL distinguishes types and sets: types are part of the meta-
language and of limited expressiveness, whereas sets are part of the object language
and very expressive.
2.1. Basic types
Isabelle’s type system is similar to MLs. There are the basic types bool, nat, and
int, and the polymorphic types  set and  list and a conversion function set from
lists to sets. The “cons” operator on lists is the in!x #, concatenation the in!x @.
The length of a list is denoted by size. The ith element (starting with 0) of list xs
is denoted by xs ! i. Overwriting the ith element of a list xs with a new value x is
written xs[i := x]. Recursive datatypes are introduced with the datatype keyword. The
remainder of this section introduces the HOL-formalization of the basic lattice-theoretic
concepts required for data 7ow analysis and its application to the JVM.
2.2. Partial orders
Partial orders are formalized as binary predicates. Based on the type synonym 
ord= ⇒ ⇒ bool and the notations x6r y= r x y and x¡r y=(x6r y∧ x = y) we
say that r is a partial order iQ the predicate order ::  ord⇒ bool holds for r:
order r = (∀ x: x 6r x) ∧ (∀ x y: x 6r y ∧ y 6r x → x=y) ∧
(∀ x y z: x 6r y ∧ y 6r z → x 6r z)
We say that r satis!es the ascending chain condition if there is no in!nite ascending
chain x0¡rx1¡r· · · and call  a top element if x6r for all x.
2.3. Semilattices
Based on the type synonyms  binop= ⇒ ⇒  and  sl=  set×  ord×  binop
and the supremum notation x+f y= f x y we say that (A; r; f ) ::  sl is a semilattice
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iQ the predicate semilat ::  sl⇒ bool holds:
semilat (A;r;f ) = order r ∧ closed A f ∧
(∀ x y ∈ A: x 6r x +f y) ∧ (∀ x y ∈ A: y 6r x +f y) ∧
(∀ x y z ∈ A: x 6r z ∧ y 6r z → x +f y 6r z)
where closed A f=∀ x y∈A: x+f y∈A
Data 7ow analysis is usually phrased in terms of in!mum semilattices. We have
chosen a supremum semilattice because it !ts better with our intended application,
where the ordering is the subtype relation and the join of two types is the least common
supertype (if it exists).
We will now look at a few datatypes and the corresponding semilattices which are
required for the construction of the JVM bytecode veri!er. The de!nition of those
semilattices follows a pattern: we lift an existing semilattice to a new semilattice with
more structure. We do this by extending the carrier set, and by giving two functionals
le and sup that lift the ordering and supremum operation to the new semilattice. In
order to avoid name clashes, Isabelle provides separate names spaces for each theory,
where a theory is like a module in a programming language. Quali!ed names are of the
form Theoryname: localname, they apply to constant de!nitions and functions as well
as type constructions. So, if we write Err: sup later on, we refer to the sup functional
de!ned for the error type in Section 2.4.
2.4. The error type and err-semilattices
Theory Err introduces an error element to model the situation where the supre-
mum of two elements does not exist. We introduce both a datatype and an equivalent
construction on sets:
datatype  err = Err | OK  err A = {Err} ∪ {OK a | a ∈ A}
An ordering r on  can be lifted to  err by making Err the top element:
le r (OK x) (OK y) = x 6r y
le r Err =True
le r Err (OK y) = False
We proved that le preserves the ascending chain condition.
The following lifting functional is frequently useful:
lift2 :: ( ⇒ 
 ⇒  err) ⇒  err ⇒ 
 err ⇒  err
lift2 f (OK x) (OK y) = f x y
lift2 f =Err
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This brings us to the genuinely new notion of an err-semilattice. It is a variation of a
semilattice with top element. Because the behavior of the ordering and the supremum
on the top element are !xed, it suUces to say how they behave on non-top elements.
Thus we can represent a semilattice with top element Err compactly by a triple of
type esl:
 ebinop =  ⇒  ⇒  err  esl =  set ×  ord ×  ebinop
Conversion between the types sl and esl is easy:
esl ::  sl ⇒  esl sl ::  esl ⇒  err sl
esl(A;r;f ) = (A; r; x y: OK(f x y)) sl(A;r;f ) = (err A; le r; lift2 f )
Now we de!ne L ::  esl to be an err-semilattice iQ sl L is a semilattice. It follows
easily that esl L is an err-semilattice if L is a semilattice. The supremum operation of
sl(esl L) is useful on its own:
sup f = lift2 (x y: OK(x +f y))
In a strongly typed environment like HOL we found err-semilattices easier to work
with than semilattices with top element.
2.5. The option type
Theory Opt introduces the new type option and the set opt as duals to type err and
set err,
datatype  option = None | Some  opt A = {None} ∪ {Some a | a ∈ A}
an ordering that makes None the bottom element, and a corresponding supremum
operation:
le r (Some x) (Some y) = x 6r y
le r None =True
le r (Some x)None = False
sup f (Some x) (Some y) = Some(f x y)
sup f None z = z
sup f z None = z
We proved that function sl(A; r; f )= (opt A; le r; sup f ) maps semilattices to semilat-
tices and that le preserves the ascending chain condition.
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The option datatype is not only useful in the semilattice context, but also
serves as a generic way to extend a given datatype by a special element, e.g. to
model maps in HOL. A frequently used function is the destructor the that satis!es
the (Some x)= x.
2.6. Products
Theory Product provides what is known as the coalesced product, where
the top elements of both components are identi!ed. In terms of err-semilattices,
this is
esl ::  esl ⇒ 
 esl ⇒ ( × 
) esl
esl (A;rA;f A) (B;rB;f B) = (A × B; le rA rB; sup f A f B)
le ::  ord ⇒ 
 ord ⇒ ( × 
) ord
le rA rB = (a1;b1)(a2;b2): a1 6rAa2 ∧ b1 6rBb2
sup ::  ebinop ⇒ 
 ebinop ⇒ ( × 
) ebinop
sup f g = (a1;b1)(a2;b2): Err:sup (x y:(x;y)) (a1 +f a2) (b1 +g b2)
Note that we use × both on the type and set level.
We have shown that if both L1 and L2 are err-semilattices, so is esl L1 L2,
and that if both rA and rB satisfy the ascending chain condition, so does
le rA rB.
2.7. Lists of =xed length
Theory Listn provides the concept of lists of a given length over a given set. In
HOL, this is formalized as a set rather than a type:
listn n A = {xs | size xs = n ∧ set xs ⊆ A}
This set can be turned into a semilattice in a componentwise manner, essentially view-
ing it as an n-fold cartesian product:
sl :: nat ⇒  sl ⇒  list sl le ::  ord ⇒  list ord
sl n (A;r;f ) = (listn n A; le r; map2 f ) le r = list-all2 (x y: x 6r y)
where map2 :: (⇒ 
⇒ ) ⇒  list⇒ 
 list⇒  list and list-all2 :: (⇒ 
⇒ bool)⇒
 list⇒ 
 list⇒ bool are the obvious functions. We introduce the notation xs6[r] ys=
xs6(le r) ys. We have shown (by induction on n) that if L is a semilattice, so is
sl n L, and that if r is a partial order and satis!es the ascending chain condition, so
does le r.
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In case we want to combine lists of diQerent lengths, or if the supremum on the
elements of the list may return Err, we use the following function:
sup :: ( ⇒ 
 ⇒  err) ⇒  list ⇒ 
 list ⇒  list err
sup f xs ys = if size xs = size ys then coalesce(map2 f xs ys) else Err
coalesce [] = OK []
coalesce (e#es) = Err:sup (x xs: x#xs) e (coalesce es)
This corresponds to the coalesced product. Below we also need the structure of all lists
up to a speci!c length:
uptoesl :: nat ⇒  esl ⇒  list esl
uptoesl n (A;r;f ) = (
⋃
i 6 n listn i A; le r; sup f )
We have shown that if L is an err-semilattice, so is uptoesl n L.
3. Data ow analysis and type system
The purpose of this section is to set up an abstract framework for type checking and
data 7ow analysis of machine code, i.e. lists of instructions. We assume that instructions
may be typed (e.g. distinguishing integer from 7oating point addition) but storage loca-
tions are not necessarily typed and may also change their type during execution. Thus
it is necessary to infer the type of each storage location at each instruction to see if the
instruction will manipulate values of the required type. To keep things abstract, we do
not !x the type system or the machine architecture. We simply assume that our model
contains a type of states that characterizes the state of the machine. This state type is
a parameter of our setup and will be represented by the type variable . Note that  is
intended not to represent values but their abstraction, types. For example, in a register
machine  would be a list of types, one for each register (roughly speaking). We can
now de!ne a method type, i.e. the type of a method, simply as a list of state types:
each element in the list characterizes the state of the machine before execution of the
corresponding instruction. We hasten to add that the name “method” is not signi!cant,
we chose it since this is what we will use the framework for later, but the frame-
work itself is not restricted to Java methods. We could also call it program type, or
procedure type, or whatever the entities to verify may be. In order to lessen the confu-
sion between types in the programming language under consideration and types in our
modeling language, the latter are sometimes referred to as HOL types. For example,
 is a HOL type (variable) that represents part of the programming language type
system.
Before we continue keeping things as abstract as possible, let us take a look at a
concrete example of how things work in the JVM.
The JVM is a stack machine where each method activation has its own expression
stack and local variables. The types of operands and results of bytecode instructions
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Fig. 1. Example of a welltyping.
are !xed (modulo subtyping), whereas the type of a storage location may diQer at
diQerent points in the program.
In Fig. 1 on the left the instructions are shown and on the right the type of the
stack elements and the local variables. The type information attached to an instruction
characterizes the state before execution of that instruction. We assume that class B is
a subclass of A and that A has a !eld F of type A. The Some before each of the
type entries means that we were able to predict some type for each of the instruc-
tions. If one of the instructions had been unreachable, the type entry would have been
None.
Execution starts with an empty stack and the two local variables hold a reference
to an object of class B and an integer. The !rst instruction loads local variable 0,
a reference to a B object, on the stack. The type information associated with the
following instruction may puzzle at !rst sight: it says that a reference to an A object
is on the stack, and that usage of local variable 1 may produce an error. This means
the type information has become less precise but is still correct: a B object is also
an A object and an integer is now classi!ed as unusable (Err). The reason for these
more general types is that the predecessor of the Store instruction may have either
been Load 0 or Goto −3. Since there exist diQerent execution paths to reach Store,
the type information of the two paths has to be “merged”. The type of the second
local variable is either Int or Class A, which are incompatible, i.e. the only common
supertype is Err.
Bytecode veri!cation is the process of inferring the types on the right from the
instruction sequence on the left and some initial condition, and of ensuring that each
instruction receives arguments of the correct type. The method type is the right-hand
side of the table, a state type is one line of it. Type inference is the computation of a
method type from an instruction sequence (usually by iteration), while type checking
means checking that a given method type !ts an instruction sequence.
With this intuition we turn our attention back to the formalization.
In this abstract setting, we do not yet have to talk about the instruction sequences
themselves. They will be hidden inside functions that characterize their behavior. These
functions form the parameters of our model, namely the type system and the data 7ow
analyzer. In the Isabelle formalization, these functions are parameters of everything. In
this article, we often make them “implicit parameters”, i.e. we pretend they are global
constants, thus increasing readability.
We !rst introduce a generic framework oriented towards data 7ow analysis
(Section 3.1). Within it we de!ne and verify a standard data 7ow analyzer, Kildall’s
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algorithm (Section 3.2). Finally, we re!ne the framework towards a static type system
(Section 3.3). In these following three sections let (A; r; f ) be a semilattice.
3.1. A generic data >ow framework
Data 7ow analysis and type systems are based on an abstract view of the semantics
of a program in terms of types instead of values. Since our programs are sequences of
instructions the semantics can be characterized by two functions:
step :: nat⇒ ⇒  is the abstract execution function: step p s is the result of executing
instruction at p starting in state s. In the literature step p is called the transfer
function or >ow function associated with instruction p.
succs :: nat⇒ nat list computes the possible successor instructions: succs p returns
[q1; : : : ; qk ] iQ execution of instruction p may transfer control to any of the instruc-
tions q1; : : : ; qk . We use lists instead of sets for reasons of executability.
We say that succs is bounded by n iQ for all p¡n the elements of succs p are less
than n. This expresses that from below instruction n, instruction n and beyond are
unreachable, i.e. control never leaves the list of instructions below n.
Data 7ow analysis is concerned with solving data 7ow equations, i.e. systems of
equations involving the 7ow functions over a semilattice. In our case step is the 7ow
function and  the semilattice. Instead of an explicit formalization of the data 7ow
equation it suUces to consider certain pre!xed points. To that end we de!ne what it
means that a method type ss is stable at p and stable:
stable ss p ≡ ∀ q∈set(succs p): step p (ss!p) 6r ss!q
stables ss ≡ ∀ p¡size ss: stable ss p
The stable method types are the pre!xed points of the associated data 7ow equation
for step
ss!p =
∑
q ∈ succs−1 p
step q (ss!q)
where we assume that r is a semilattice and
∑
the corresponding supremum operation.
Note that this equation has only been included here for clarity and is not part of our
formalization. Our reference point will be the notion of stability. It induces the notion
of a method type ts being a welltyping w.r.t. step:
wt-step ts ≡ ∀ p¡size ts: ts!p =  ∧ stable ts p
Here , another implicit parameter of wt-step, is assumed to be a special element
in the state space indicating a type error. Usually  will be the top element of the
ordering.
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A welltyping is a witness of welltypedness in the sense of stability. Now we turn
to the problem of computing such a witness. This is precisely the task of a BCV: it
computes a method type such that the absence of  in the result means the method
is welltyped. Formally, a function bcv ::  list⇒  list is a bytecode veri#er (w.r.t.
n :: nat and A ::  set, see below) iQ
∀ ss ∈ list n A: (∀ p¡n: (bcv ss)!p = ) = (∃ ts ∈ list n A: ss 6[r] ts ∧ wt-step ts)
The notation 6[r] lifts 6r to lists (see Section 2.7). In practice, bcv ss itself will be
the welltyping, and it will also be the least welltyping. However, it is simpler not to
require this.
The introduction of a subset A of the state space  is necessary to make distinctions
beyond HOL’s type system: for example, when representing a list of registers,  is
likely to be a HOL list type; but the fact that in any particular program the number
of registers is !xed cannot be expressed as a HOL type, because it requires dependent
types to formalize lists of a !xed length. We use sets to express such !ne grained
distinctions.
3.2. Kildall’s algorithm
This section !rst de!nes and then veri!es a functional version of Kildall’s algo-
rithm [14,16], a standard data 7ow analysis tool. In fact, the description of bytecode
veri!cation in the oUcial JVM speci!cation [15, pp. 129–130] is essentially Kildall’s
algorithm, an iterative computation of the solution to a data 7ow problem. The main
loop operates on a method type ss and a worklist w :: nat set. The worklist contains
the indices of those elements of ss that have changed and whose changes still need to
be propagated to their successors. Each iteration picks an element p from w, executes
instruction number p, and propagates the new state to the successor instructions of p.
Iteration terminates once w becomes empty: in each iteration, p is removed but new
elements can be added to w. For reasons detailed below, the algorithm is expressed in
terms of a prede!ned while-combinator of type (⇒ bool)⇒ (⇒ )⇒ ⇒  which
satis!es the recursion equation
while b c s = (if b s then while b c (c s) else s)
Clearly while (s: b s) (s: c s) is the functional counterpart of the imperative program
while b(s) do s := c(s). The main loop can now be expressed as
iter ss w = while ((ss;w): w = {})
((ss;w): let p = SOME p: p ∈ w; t = step p (ss!p)
in propa (succs p) t ss (w−{p}))
(ss;w)
As in Section 3.1 the functions step and succs are implicit parameters.
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The choice of which position to consider next is made by Hilbert’s ”-operator, written
SOME above: SOME x: P x is some arbitrary but !xed x such that P x holds; if
there is no such x, then the value of SOME x: P x is arbitrary but still de!ned. Since
the choice in iter is guarded by w = {}, we know that p∈w. An implementation is
free to choose whichever element it wants.
Propagating the result t of executing instruction number p to all successors is
expressed by the primitive recursive function propa:
propa [] t ss w = (ss;w)
propa (q#qs) t ss w = (let u = t +f ss!q;
w ′ = (if u = ss!q then w else {q} ∪ w)
in propa qs t (ss[q := u]) w ′)
In the terminology of the oUcial JVM speci!cation [15, p. 130] t is “merged” with
the state of all successor instructions q, i.e. the supremum is computed. If this results
in a change of ss ! q then q is inserted into w. The supremum operation f is another
implicit parameter of the algorithm.
Kildall’s algorithm is simply a call to iter where the worklist is initialized with the
set of unstable indices; upon termination we project on the !rst (fst) component:
kildall ss = fst(iter ss {p: p ¡ size ss ∧ ¬stable ss p})
Essentially the same algorithm was presented in [17], with one important diQerence:
we did not show the actual de!nition of iter, because that was an opaque well-founded
recursion. The recursion equation shown instead was what one would have written in
a programming language with partial functions, but in HOL this is impossible, because
iter is partial. It is only now that the while-combinator has become available that we
can really de!ne iter in a natural and directly executable form. The de!nition of while
itself and the derivation of the corresponding recursion equation is not completely
trivial; for details see [4].
The key theorem is that Kildall’s algorithm is a bytecode veri!er as de!ned
above:
Theorem 1. If (A; r; f ) is a semilattice, r meets the ascending chain condition, step
is monotone (w.r.t. A and n) and preserves A upto n, and succs is bounded by n,
then kildall is a bytecode veri=er.
This theorem is a corollary to the following lemma about iter:
Lemma 2. Assuming the same preconditions as in Theorem 1, if ss0 is stable at all
p¡n that are not in w0, ss0 ∈ list n A, w0 is bounded in size by n, and iter ss0 w0=
(ss ′;w ′), then
ss ′ ∈ list n A ∧ stables ss ′ ∧ ss0 6[r] ss ′ ∧
(∀ ts∈list n A: ss0 6[r] ts ∧ stables ts → ss ′ 6[r] ts)
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This lemma is proved with the help of the usual proof rule for while-loops rephrased
functionally in terms of the while-combinator. That theorem is already part of the
Isabelle library. The invariant is the following predicate on ss and w:
ss ∈ list n A ∧ (∀ p¡n: p =∈ w → stable ss p) ∧ ss0 6[r] ss ∧
(∀ ts∈list n A: ss0 6[r] ts ∧ stables ts → ss 6[r] ts) ∧ (∀ p∈w: p ¡ n)
Except for the last conjunct, this is identical to the desired postcondition. Hence it is
easy to see that upon termination (w= {}) the postcondition holds. Similarly, it is easy
to see that the invariant holds initially, i.e. for ss= ss0 and w=w0. Preservation of the
invariant requires a number of lemmas about propa which are not interesting enough to
warrant showing them here. Termination is proved with the help of the lexicographic
product of two well-founded orderings: with every iteration, either ss increases w.r.t.
6[r] (hence we need the ascending chain condition), or ss stays unchanged but w
decreases (and w is !nite because it is bounded by n).
3.3. Re=ning step
We close this section with a little re!nement of the generic step. In practice, step
will be composed of two functions: one that checks the applicability of the instruction
in the current state, and one that carries out the instruction assuming it is applicable.
These two functions will be called app and eA. Furthermore the state space  will be
of the form  err for a suitable type . In which case the error element  above is
Err itself. Given functions app :: nat⇒ ⇒ bool and eA :: nat⇒ ⇒ , step is easily
de!ned:
step p ≡ lift (t: if app p t then OK(eA p t) else Err)
Similarly, we can re!ne the notion of welltyping w.r.t. step to welltyping w.r.t. app
and eA :
wt-app-eA ts ≡ ∀ p¡size ts: app p (ts!p) ∧ (∀ q∈set(succs p): eA p (ts!p) 6r ts!q)
This is very natural: every instruction is applicable in its start state, and the eQect is
compatible with the state expected by all successor instructions.
It is almost but not quite the case that wt-step and wt-app-eA coincide. We have
proved the following two lemmas:
Lemma 3. If succs is bounded by size ts and every instruction has a successor, then
wt-step ts implies wt-app-eA (map ok-val ts) where ok-val (OK x) = x.
Why the requirement that every instruction must have a successor? Otherwise ts
may be a welltyping w.r.t. step for the trivial reason that stable ts p is vacuously true
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if succs p= {}, even though app p (ts!p) may be false. In the other direction, this
problem disappears:
Lemma 4. If succs is bounded by size ts, then wt-app-eA ts implies that wt-step (map
OK ts).
In a sense wt-app-eA is more precise than wt-step. This is not surprising: it has
more structure to work with. We can still model everything that is captured by wt-app
-eA with wt-step, though: Lemma 3 tells us that they agree when each instruction has
an successor, so for instructions with no successor we just de!ne succs p= {p} and
eA p= id. This does not change the behavior of the BCV and makes sure that both
formulations are equivalent.
4. Java Virtual Machine (JVM)
In the sections above we have presented an abstract de!nition of welltyping and also
a means to calculate one. We will now instantiate these abstract notions for the Java
Virtual Machine. The instantiation presented here is a bit diQerent from the one we
already gave in [17]. The version we will discuss here is a direct integration with our
existing Java formalization. The theory in [17] was based on Java in that it used the
same concepts, instruction set, etc., but formally it was a separate theory. We will !rst
give an overview of the Java formalization—see [19] for an in depth introduction
to a slightly earlier version of it—and then discuss how it works together with the
de!nitions of the BCV framework.
The Java model is a downsized version of the real Java language and JVM. It
does not contain threads, interfaces, packages, or visibility modi!ers like public or
private. It does contain a small but representative instruction set, classes, inheritance,
and object oriented method invocation. The formalization includes the source language,
its operational semantics and type system together with a proof of type safety, and also
the bytecode language together with its operational semantics, type system, proof of
type safety, and now also an executable veri!ed BCV. To keep things abstract and
manageable, the source and bytecode language share as many notions as possible,
i.e. program structure, wellformedness of programs, large parts of the type system, etc.
4.1. The Java VM
Since source and target languages share the same model of program structure, the
virtual machine of Java does not have a notion of class !les and constant pool like
Sun’s JVM has. A program is a list of classes and their declaration information, a class
a list of methods and !elds. For bytecode veri!cation we will only be concerned with
the method level, so we only describe the types at this level in more detail:
 mdecl = sig × ty × 
sig=mname × ty list
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Since they are used for both the source and the bytecode level, Java method decla-
rations are parameterized: they consist of a signature (name and parameter types), the
return type (ty are the Java types), and a method body of type  (which in our case
will be the bytecode).
Method declarations come with a method dictionary lookup function method, such
that method (;C) sig looks up a method with signature sig in class C of program
. It yields a value of type (cname× ty× ) option indicating whether a method
with that signature exists, in which class it is de!ned (it could be a superclass of C
since method takes inheritance and overriding into account), and also the rest of the
declaration information: the return type and body.
The runtime environment, i.e. the state space of the JVM, is modeled a bit more
closely after the real thing. The state consists of a heap, a stack of call frames, and a
7ag whether an exception was raised (and if yes, which one).
The heap is simple: a partial function from locations to objects, in Isabelle aheap=
loc⇒ obj option. Here, loc is the type of addresses and obj is short for cname× (vname
× cname⇒ val option), i.e. each object is a pair consisting of a class name (the
class the object belongs to) and a mapping for the !elds of the object (taking the
name and de!ning class of a !eld, and yielding its value if such a !eld exists, None
otherwise).
In the JVM each method execution gets its own call frame, containing its own
operand stack (a list of values), its own set of local variables (also a list of values),
and its own program counter. Since we later need to know which method each call
frame belongs to, we also store the class and signature (i.e. name and parameter types)
of the method and arrive at:
frame= opstack × locvars × cname × sig × nat
opstack = val list
locvars= val list
The JVM state is then:
jvm-state= xcpt option × aheap × frame list
xcpt=NullPointer | ClassCast | OutOfMemory
4.2. Operational semantics
This section sketches the state transition relation of the Java VM.
We will be relatively brief here and only concentrate on the parts we need for
the BCV.
Fig. 2 shows the instruction set. Method bodies are lists of such instructions together
with two integers mxs and mxl containing the maximum operand stack size and the
number of local variables (not counting the this pointer and parameters of the method
which get stored in the !rst 0 to n registers). So the type parameter  for method bod-
ies gets instantiated with nat× nat× instr list, i.e. mdecl= sig× ty× nat× nat× instr
list.
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datatype instr =
Load nat load from local variable
| Store nat store into local variable
| LitPush val push a literal (constant)
| New cname create object on heap
| Get=eld vname cname fetch !eld from object
| Put=eld vname cname set !eld in object
| Checkcast cname check if object is of given type
| Invoke cname mname (ty list) invoke instance method
| Return return from method
| Dup duplicate top element
| IAdd integer addition
| Goto int goto relative address
| Ifcmpeq int branch if top elements are equal
Fig. 2. The Java instruction set.
The state transition relation s
jvm→ t is built on a function exec describing one-step
execution:
exec :: jvm-state ⇒ jvm-state option
exec (xp; hp; []) =None
exec (Some xp; hp; frs) =None
exec (None; hp; f #frs) = let (stk;loc;C ;sig;pc) = f ;
i = (5th (the (method (;C) sig))) ! pc
in Some (exec-instr i hp stk loc C sig pc frs)
It says that execution halts if the call frame stack is empty or an exception has
occurred. In all other cases execution is de!ned, exec decomposes the top call frame,
looks up the current method, retrieves the instruction list (the 5th element) of that
method, and delegates the rest to exec-instr which de!nes the execution rules for sin-
gle instructions. As throughout the rest of this article, the program  is treated as global
parameter.
The state transition relation is the re7exive transitive closure of the de!ned part of
exec:
s
jvm→ t = (s;t) ∈ {(s;t) | exec s = Some t}∗
The de!nition of exec-instr is straightforward for most instructions. In the Load idx
case for instance, we just take the value at position idx in the local variables and put
it on top of the stack. Apart from incrementing the program counter the rest remains
untouched:
exec-instr (Load idx) hp stk vars Cl sig pc frs =
(None; hp; ((vars ! idx) # stk; vars; Cl ; sig; pc+1) #frs)
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Since they will recur in a slightly diQerent form in Section 5.2 we also show the
rules for New, Invoke and Return:
exec-instr (New C) hp stk vars Cl sig pc frs =
let (ref ;xp ′) = new-Addr hp;
hp ′ = if xp ′=None then hp(ref := Some (blank C)) else hp;
stk ′ = if xp ′=None then (Addr ref )#stk else stk
in (xp ′; hp ′; (stk ′; vars; Cl ; sig; pc+1)#frs)
The New rule uses two helper functions new-Addr :: aheap⇒ loc× xcpt option and
blank :: cname⇒ obj. The former returns a new, unused address on the heap or an
OutOfMemory exception. The latter constructs a blank object with all !elds set to
their default values. With these, the New C instruction either sets the exception 7ag
to OutOfMemory or constructs a new object on the heap and puts its address on top
of the stack.
Invoke on a method with name mn of class C with formal parameter types ps is a
bit more involved:
exec-instr (Invoke C mn ps) hp stk vars Cl sig pc frs =
let n = size ps;
args = take n stk;
ref = stk!n;
xp ′ = raise-xcpt (ref=Null) NullPointer;
D = fst(the(hp(the-Addr ref )));
(dc; ; ; mxl ; ) = the (method (;D) (mn;ps));
frs ′ = if xp ′=None then [] else
[([];ref #rev args@replicate mxl arbitrary;dc;(mn;ps);0)]
in (xp ′; hp; frs ′@(stk; vars; Cl ; sig; pc)#frs)
The !rst n values on the stack are the actual parameters, the next value after that is the
reference on which to invoke the method. If it is Null, the 7ag is set to NullPointer
exception and execution will stop. Otherwise, we look up the dynamic type of the
object (which could be a subclass of C) on the heap, and do a method lookup with
this dynamic type to !nd out in which class dc the method really is de!ned.
With these values we construct a new call frame for the new method: initially, it
has an empty stack, a reference to this in local variable 0, the actual parameters in
variables 1 to n, and the rest of the local variables !lled with an arbitrary value. We
!ll in the de!ning class dc, the signature of the method, and set the pc to instruction
0. The new call frame is put in front of the current one which remains unchanged until
the newly invoked method returns.
If execution of the new method ends, it must end with a Return instruction:
exec-instr Return G hp stk0 vars Cl sig0 pc frs =
if frs=[] then (None; hp; []) else
let val = hd stk0;
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(stk;loc;C ;sig;pc) = hd frs;
n = length (snd sig0)
in (None; hp; (val#(drop (n+1) stk);loc;C ;sig;pc+1)#tl frs)
Return does nothing if the call frame is already empty. If it is not, the return value is
the top of stack in the current call frame, the current call frame is removed and the
frame directly beneath (the calling method) is updated: we drop the parameters and
object reference of the Invoke instruction from the stack, push the return value, and
increment the pc.
These rules obviously do not implement a defensive VM. Nowhere do we check
if values have the right type, if the operand stack contains values at all when we refer
to its top, if a local variable with a given index even exists, etc. Since HOL is a logic
of total functions, execution in all these cases is still de!ned. However, we do not
know anything about such de!ned but unspeci!ed states, and we will certainly not be
able to prove any interesting properties like type conformance about them.
4.3. Bytecode veri=cation and type safety
This section presents the BCV speci!cation for Java, and its integration with the
executable BCV framework of Section 3.2.
We will proceed as follows: !rst, we again take a look at the state space—this
time with types instead of values since we are interested in abstract execution only.
Then, we will turn this state space into a semilattice which gives us an ordering on it
and a supremum operation. We will use the ordering to describe welltypings statically.
This part is taken from the existing Java formalization, it comes with a type safety
result about welltypings. The supremum operation is the part we additionally need for
Kildall’s algorithm. We will see that the result of Kildalls algorithm agrees with the
speci!cation of welltypings. This !nally implies that the type safety results for Java
welltypings also apply to the executable BCV.
The Java BCV speci!cation describes how welltypings of operand stack and local
variables of a method look like (as in the example, Fig. 1 at the very beginning).
Values on the operand stack must always contain a known type, the type of values in
the local variables may be unknown (encoded by Err):
state-type= ty list × ty err list
datatype ty =PrimT prim-ty | RefT ref-ty
datatype prim-ty=Void | Bool | Int
datatype ref-ty =NullT | ClassT cname
In this de!nition, ty is the HOL type describing the Java type system. It consists
of primitive types like Int or Void, and references types. We abbreviate the reference
type RefT (ClassT C) by Class C and RefT NullT, the type of the value Null,
by NT.
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The Java types come with a subtype ordering 4 that builds on the direct subclass
relation subcls  induced by the program . It satis!es:
T 4T
NT 4RefT T
Class C 4Class D if (C ;D) ∈ (subcls )∗
where (C ;D)∈ (subcls )∗ means that C is a subclass of D.
For every class hierarchy, that is for every program, this subtype ordering may be
a diQerent one. In the Isabelle formalization the ordering 4 therefore has  as an
additional parameter, in this paper  is an implicit parameter of everything.
To handle unreachable code, the BCV will not directly work on state-type, but on
state-type option instead. In the data7ow analysis None will indicate the state type
of instructions that have not been reached yet. If None occurs in the welltyping, the
corresponding instruction is unreachable.
4.3.1. Java types as semilattice
If we want to instantiate Kildall’s algorithm we need to turn !rst ty and then
state-type into a semilattice.
Theory JType concerns the semilattice structure of ty: the ordering we already have
with 4. For the carrier set types we take the set of all primitive types and all sub-
classes of Object de!ned in the program. The supremum operation sup is also relatively
straightforward:
sup :: ty ⇒ ty ⇒ ty err
sup NT (Class C) = OK (Class C)
sup (Class C) NT = OK (Class C)
sup (Class C) (Class D) = OK (Class (some-lub C D))
sup t1 t2 = if t1 = t2 then OK t1 else Err
The auxiliary function some-lub used in the computation of the supremum of two
classes is de!ned non-constructively (as some least upper bound, using Hilbert’s
”-operator). Of course we also prove that (under suitable conditions) least upper bounds
are uniquely determined and exist. Thus our work is independent of the particular al-
gorithm used for this calculation.
Theorem 5. The triple esl≡ (types;4;sup) is an err-semilattice provided the class
hierarchy subcls  is single valued (each subclass has at most one direct superclass,
i.e.  represents a single inheritance hierarchy) and subcls  is acyclic.
Univalence and acyclicity together imply that subcls  is a set of trees, and types
focuses on the subtree below Object.
Because any in!nite subtype chain would induce an in!nite subclass chain we also
obtain
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Lemma 6. If (subcls )−1 is wellfounded (there is no in=nite ascending subclass chain
(Ci; Ci+1)∈ subcls ) then 4 satis=es the ascending chain condition.
We call  wellformed if subcls  is single valued and (subcls )−1 is wellfounded.
Note that by incorporating a !xed class hierarchy into our model we assume that all
required classes have been loaded, i.e. we model an eager class loader. Although Sun’s
JVM is a bit lazier, the JVM speci!cation [15, p. 127] does permit eager loading.
Now we come to the core of the type system, namely the semilattice structure  on
state-type option. Turning state-type option into a semilattice is easy, because all of
its constituent types are (err-)semilattices. The expression stacks form an err-semilattice
because the supremum of stacks of diQerent size is Err; the list of registers forms a
semilattice because the number mxr of registers is !xed (it is the number mxl of local
variables plus the number of parameters of the method plus one for the this pointer):
stk-esl :: nat ⇒ ty list esl
stk-esl mxs ≡ upto-esl mxs (JType:esl)
reg-sl :: nat ⇒ ty err list sl
reg-sl mxr ≡ Listn:sl mxr (Err:sl (JType:esl))
The stack and registers are combined in a coalesced product via Product:esl and then
embedded into option and err (as in Section 3.3) to form the !nal semilattice for the
state space = state-type option err:
sl :: nat ⇒ nat ⇒ state-type option err sl
sl mxs mxr ≡ Err:sl(Opt:esl(Product:esl (stk-esl mxs) (Err:esl(reg-sl mxr))))
The three components of sl are called states (the carrier set), le (the ordering), and
sup (the supremum).
Combining the theorems about the various (err-)semilattice constructions involved
in the de!nition of sl (starting from Theorem 5), it is easy to prove
Corollary 7. If  is wellformed then sl is a semilattice.
It is trivial to show that =Err is the top element of this semilattice.
4.3.2. Type checking
The semilattice construction above gives us an ordering
6 ′ :: state-type option ⇒ state-type option ⇒ bool
which is already suUcient to describe type checking.
Type checking is what the original Java BCV speci!cation does: it describes well-
typings by stating conditions for correct method types. In contrast to the type inference
in Kildall’s Algorithm, we do not need a supremum operation for this.
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Since the Java speci!cation predates our work about executable bytecode veri!ers,
it looks a bit diQerent from our de!nition of welltypings wt-app-eA in Section 3.3.
Nevertheless Theorem 10 will connect wt-app-eA to wt-method and show that it ex-
actly describes welltypings ’ :: state-type option list of methods:
wt-instr i ’ pc ≡
app i (’!pc)∧
(∀ pc ′ ∈ set (succs i pc): pc ′ ¡ size ins ∧ (eA i (’!pc) 6 ′ ’!pc ′))
wt-start ’ ≡
Some ([];(OK (Class C))#(map OK ps)@(replicate mxl Err)) 6 ′ ’!0
wt-method ’ ≡
0 ¡ size ins ∧ wt-start ’ ∧ (∀ pc: pc ¡ size ins → wt-instr (ins!pc) ’ pc)
Again we have some implicit parameters: C is the class where the method under
scrutiny is de!ned, ps the types of its formal parameters, ins the instruction list (method
body), and mxl the number of local variables. Apart from wt-start and the additional
condition that the instruction list may not be empty, wt-instr and wt-method together
coincide nicely with wt-app-eA and the fact that succs is bounded by size ins. Cor-
responding to the start value of the iteration in Kildall’s algorithm, wt-start places a
restriction on the welltyping of instruction 0.
The type checking speci!cation is de!ned in terms of the functions app, eA and
succs as introduced in Section 3.3. They can directly be reused later for Kildall’s
algorithm.
The de!nition of succs is straightforward:
succs :: instr ⇒ nat ⇒ nat list
succs (Ifcmpeq b) pc= [pc+1; nat (pc+b)]
succs (Goto b) pc = [nat (pc+b)]
succs Return pc = [pc]
succs instr pc = [pc+1]
Since the oQset b in branching instructions may be negative, we need to turn the result
of pc+b back to type nat by explicit conversion. The successor of Return is again pc
since Lemma 3 requires succs to be non-empty for all instructions. The last equation
is the default: we just increment the pc by one.
Figs. 3 and 4 show the de!nitions of app and eA. Both are !rst de!ned via app ′ and
eA ′ on state-type and then lifted to state-type option. They use the program , the
maximum size of the operand stack mxs, and the return type rt of the current method
as implicit parameters.
In app ′ a few new functions occur: =eld is analogous to method and looks up dec-
laration information of object !elds (de!ning class and type); apart from that there are
only the obvious functions on lists rev ::  list⇒ list, zip ::  list⇒
 list⇒(×
) list,
and take :: nat⇒  list ⇒ list.
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app ′ :: instr × state-type ⇒ bool
app ′ (Load idx; (st; lt)) = idx ¡ size lt ∧ lt!idx = Err ∧
size st ¡ mxs
app ′ (Store idx; (t#st; lt)) = idx ¡ size lt
app ′ (LitPush v; (st; lt)) = size st ¡ mxs ∧ typeof v = None
app ′ (Get=eld F C ; (t#st; lt)) = is-class  C ∧ t 4 Class C ∧
(∃ t ′: =eld (;C) F = Some (C ;t ′))
app ′ (Put=eld F C ; (t1#t2#st; lt)) = is-class  C ∧
(∃ t ′: =eld (;C) F = Some(C ;t ′) ∧
t2 4 Class C ∧ t1 4 t ′)
app ′ (New C ; (st; lt)) = is-class  C ∧ size st ¡ mxs
app ′ (Checkcast C ; (RefT t#st; lt)) = is-class  C
app ′ (Dup; (t#st; lt)) = 1+size st ¡ mxs
app ′ (IAdd ; (t1#t2#st; lt)) = t1 = PrimT Int ∧ t2 = PrimT Int
app ′ (Ifcmpeq b; (t#t ′#st; lt)) = (t = t ′) ∨
(∃ r r ′: t = RefT r ∧ t ′ = RefT r ′)
app ′ (Goto b; s) = True
app ′ (Return; (t#st; lt)) = t 4 rt
app ′ (Invoke C mn ps; (st; lt)) = size ps ¡ size st ∧
method (;C) (mn;ps) = None ∧
let as = rev (take (size ps) st);
t = st!size ps
in t 4 Class C ∧ is-class  C ∧
(∀ (a;f )∈set(zip as ps): a 4 f )
app ′ (i; s) = False
app :: instr ⇒ state-type option ⇒ bool
app i s ≡ case s of None ⇒ True | Some t ⇒ app ′ (i; t)
Fig. 3. Applicability of instructions.
In eA ′ we use typeof :: val⇒ ty option returning None for addresses, and the type of
the value otherwise. The method expression for Invoke merely determines the return
type of the method in question. The lifting functional option-map :: (⇒ 
)⇒  op-
tion⇒ 
 option satis!es the two equations option-map f None =None and option-map
f (Some x)=Some ( f x).
4.3.3. Type inference
If we construct step as in Section 3.3 from app and eA, we can instantiate Kildall’s
algorithm for the Java VM:
kiljvm :: instr list ⇒ state-type option err list ⇒ state-type option err list
kiljvm ins ≡ kildall le sup (step ins) (pc: succs (ins!pc) pc)
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eA ′ :: instr × state-type ⇒ state-type
eA ′ (Load idx; (st; lt)) = (ok-val (lt!idx)#st; lt)
eA ′ (Store idx; (t#st; lt)) = (st; lt[idx:= OK t])
eA ′ (LitPush v; (st; lt)) = (the (typeof v)#st; lt)
eA ′ (Get=eld F C ; (t#st; lt)) = (snd (the (=eld (;C) F ))#st; lt)
eA ′ (Put=eld F C ; (t1#t2#st; lt)) = (st; lt)
eA ′ (New C ; (st; lt)) = (Class C#st; lt)
eA ′ (Checkcast C ; (t#st; lt)) = (Class C#st; lt)
eA ′ (Dup; (t#st; lt)) = (t#t#st; lt)
eA ′ (IAdd ; (t1#t2#st; lt)) = (PrimT Int#st; lt)
eA ′ (Ifcmpeq b; (t1#t2#st; lt)) = (st; lt)
eA ′ (Goto b; s) = s
eA ′ (Return; s) = s
eA ′ (Invoke C mn ps; (st; lt)) = let st ′ = drop (1+size ps) st;
( ; rt; ; ; ) = the (method (;C) (mn;ps))
in (rt#st ′; lt)
eA :: instr ⇒ state-type option ⇒ state-type option
eA i ≡ option-map (s: eA ′ (i; s))
Fig. 4. EQect of instructions on the state type.
The proof of the following theorem is easy:
Lemma 8. step is monotone and preserves the carrier set.
With Theorem 1 we therefore get
Corollary 9. If  is wellformed and succs is bounded by the number of instructions
then kiljvm is a BCV.
We can further de!ne
wt-kil ≡ bounded (pc: succs (ins!pc) pc) (size ins) ∧ 0 ¡ size ins ∧
let S0 = Some ([];(OK (Class C))#(map OK ps)@(replicate mxl Err));
’0 = (OK S0)#(replicate (size ins−1) (OK None));
in ∀ n ¡ size ins: (kiljvm ’0)!n = Err
This de!nition is again in the context of a method, i.e. it uses the implicit parameters
ins (instruction sequence), C (de!ning class), ps (formal parameter types), and mxl
(number of local variables). From Corollary 9 together with Lemmas 3 and 4 we obtain
the following theorem.
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Theorem 10. If the program  is wellformed, if ’0 is de=ned as in wt-kil, and
if wt-kil holds for a method, then wt-method (kiljvm ’0) holds for the same method.
Although useful on its own in the form above, Theorem 10 becomes clearer rephras-
ed: if  is wellformed and wt-kil holds for a method, then this method is type correct
(there exists a welltyping ’ such that wt-method ’). It connects the executable BCV
with the static description of welltypings.
4.3.4. Type safety
The most interesting property we have proved about wt-method is type safety. So
far we have considered an abstraction of the JVM that works on types rather than
values. It remains to show that this abstraction is faithful, i.e. that welltypedness on
this abstract level actually guarantees the absence of type errors in the concrete JVM
operating on values.
The original Java BCV speci!cation is by Pusch [20] who showed that it implies
type soundness of the concrete JVM. Roughly speaking, she proved that during exe-
cution of welltyped code, all values conform to the types given in the welltyping. That
is, she de!ned a conformance relation correct-state s  between a concrete machine
state s (of HOL type jvm-state) and a program type  :: cname⇒ sig⇒ state-type
option list (’ lifted to programs, see also Section A.1 for the de!nition conformance).
And she proved
wt-jvm-prog  ∧ correct-state s  ∧ s jvm→ t → correct-state t 
where wt-jvm-prog is again wt-method lifted to programs, i.e. wt-jvm-prog holds if
wt-method holds for all methods in all classes of . The theorem says that a welltyping
guarantees type safe execution.
We can also characterize concrete starting states s for which execution is type safe
without referring to the calculated welltyping at all: if wt-kil holds then it suUces
to look at the start value ’0 de!ned in wt-kil. States s satisfying correct-state s
0 (where 0 is again ’0 lifted to programs) will also satisfy correct-state s 
since the result  of Kildall’s algorithm lies above its start value and correct-state is
monotone.
5. Object initialization
With object initialization we address a particular feature of the Java bytecode ver-
i!er: the test whether each new object is properly initialized before it is used. This
not only includes a guarantee that for each object its constructor is called before its
!elds or methods are accessed, but also that each constructor calls the constructor of
the object’s superclass before it returns or begins with the rest of the initialization
process.
Why care at all about object initialization? The question is not as rhetoric as it
may seem—object initialization is not necessary for the type safety of the language,
the default values of !elds do nicely. After all, we have just claimed in Section 4
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: : :
New A Allocate new space for class A
Dup Duplicate reference on the stack
Load 0 Push constructor parameter
Invoke−special A (init; [Class B]) Invoke constructor on class A
: : :
Fig. 5. A typical object creation=constructor call code piece.
that Java is type safe and there was no mention of object initialization anywhere.
The feature is interesting because large parts of Java’s security mechanisms depend on
constructors being called before objects are used and also on superclass constructors
being called before the own constructor is executed. In this way and together with
access modi!ers secure, consistent object states can be guaranteed.
The purpose of this section is twofold. On the one hand it presents the formalization
of an additional important and non-trivial feature of the Java BCV together with its
proof of correctness. On the other hand it demonstrates the 7exibility of our BCV
framework by showing how it deals with signi!cant changes and extensions to the
speci!cation of the existing Java BCV. Not only do we now want to prove stronger
properties of the BCV, but also the type system is now a new one, and the instruction
set along with its operational semantics is slightly diQerent.
We extend our model in four steps: First we explain how object initialization works
and de!ne a type system for it in Section 5.1. Then we proceed in Section 5.2 with
the changes to the VM and the operational semantics. In Section 5.3 we de!ne the
BCV for object initialization. Finally, type safety relates the latter two in Section 5.4.
5.1. The new type system
The JVM speci!cation [15, pp. 131–133] gives a short description how to check
for proper object initialization. Fig. 5 is a typical piece of bytecode for the object
creation=constructor call cycle as it is produced by common Java compilers (the ex-
ample from [15] translated to Java).
The instruction sequence !rst allocates space for the still uninitialized object, and
then duplicates the reference to that object for the constructor call. After the constructor
call the reference to the newly created and initialized object is on top of the operand
stack.
To deal with that kind of situations, the JVM speci!cation proposes to introduce
two new arti!cial types that mark not yet initialized values; we will call them UnInit
and PartInit.
As the name suggests, UnInit stands for uninitialized, freshly created objects. The
reference on top of the stack after the New A instruction would get the type UnInit
A. After the constructor has been called on that reference the object is initialized and
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we can replace UnInit A by our usual type Class A. As the JVM speci!cation [15,
pp. 132–133] points out, that is not enough, though:
The instruction number needs to be stored as part of the special type, as there
may be multiple not-yet-initialized instances of a class in existence on the operand
stack at one time. For example, the Java virtual machine instruction sequence that
implements
new InputStream(new Foo(), new InputStream("foo"))
may have two uninitialized instances of InputStream on the operand stack at once.
When an instance initialization method is invoked on a class instance, only those
occurrences of the special type on the operand stack or in the local variable array
that are the same object as the class instance are replaced.
By storing the program counter of the instruction that created a reference, we in fact
implement a simple alias analysis: the type entry UnInit C pc keeps track of one
speci!c value (the reference created by the instruction New C at position pc).
The PartInit type is easier: it marks the type of local variable 0 (the this pointer)
in constructors. It can be replaced by the normal type of the class as soon as the
superclass constructor has been invoked.
The following datatype de!nition captures the above formally; the constructor Init
ty stands for the normal, initialized Java types.
datatype init-ty = Init ty | UnInit cname nat | PartInit cname
Our new type system in the BCV has init-ty wherever there was ty before, i.e. on the
stack, or beneath the OK =Err structure in the local variables.
The BCV is also required to check that the superclass constructor has been called on
all paths out of the constructor. For this we extend the state type by a component of
HOL type bool. It is set to True when the superclass constructor is called, and checked
for in the Return instruction rule when we are verifying a constructor. Since most of
our typing rules remain the same as without the additional bool level, we introduce a
new state-bool, and state-type is now:
state-type= init-ty list × init-ty err list
state-bool = state-type × bool
To deal with unreachable code, the BCV is again lifted to state-bool option.
Fig. 6 shows a welltyping for the instructions of Fig. 5 with the new state type. To
!t it on the page we have left out the option and bool component.
5.2. Operational semantics
This section covers the changes to the operational semantics we need to model
constructor calls and their correct handling in the BCV.
For one we obviously need constructors. In the real JVM, constructors are methods
with a special name <init> and no return value. Similarly, in Java constructors are
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Fig. 6. Example of a welltyping with object initialization.
ordinary methods with a special name init, but they may have a return value as any
other method (which we have ignored in Fig. 6).
We also need a bytecode instruction to call constructors: Invoke-spcl. Similar to the
Invoke instruction, it has a class and a method signature as parameters. In contrast to
Invoke it does not do a virtual method call, but a static one. Java does not contain
static methods apart from constructors; therefore Invoke-spcl can only be used for
constructor calls.
Since we want to prove something about how far objects are initialized, we need to
observe the initialization status of individual objects. The current Java VM state does
not allow this: from heap, stack and local variables we do not get any information
how far an object is initialized. Thus we introduce a new, arti!cial component into the
state: a second heap, in structure mirroring the real one, that stores the initialization
status using values of HOL type init-ty. Formally, the new component iheap is simply
a function from locations to init-ty. At this point the class name parameter of PartInit
comes into play: if an object gets the tag PartInit C it means that the object is
initialized up to class C in the class hierarchy, or, more precisely, that the constructor
of C’s superclass must be called before the !elds of the object can be accessed.
This new component of the JVM state only plays the role of an auxiliary variable
for the type safety proof and does not alter the observable behavior of the former Java
VM.
Unfortunately recording the initialization status of objects induces another problem:
in our type safety proof we rely on a large invariant which requires that objects once
allocated do not change their type on the heap. Values may change of course, and
new objects may be created, but the type information of existing objects (that the
invariant relates to what the BCV has predicted) may not change. This also applies to
the new iheap component. Observing the changes during the lifetime of objects is the
very purpose of iheap, so we need to accommodate it somehow. We use the solution
Freund proposes in [8]: the invariant may not allow type changes, but it does allow to
create new objects. So for each constructor call we create a new blank object which
is a copy of the object before, only the initialization status tag gets updated. When a
constructor is !nished, it replaces the uninitialized reference in the calling method by
the now initialized own object.
This sounds like a large modi!cation, but on closer inspection there is again no ob-
servational diQerence in executions between creating new objects (and then discarding
the super7uous ones) and the standard semantics.
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The initialization process is basically a chain of constructor calls along the class
hierarchy. It is !nished when the constructor of class Object has been called. Be-
fore that, in between constructor calls, the object is inaccessible. During the whole
process all !elds retain their default value, and no method other than the constructor
can be invoked on it. Once the end of the chain is reached with the constructor
of class Object, we just work on the last allocated object. Because each constructor
replaces the object of the calling constructor, all intermediate objects are
discarded.
In order to replace the correct reference when a constructor is !nished, we extend
our de!nition of call frames from Section 4.1 by a pair of references. In that pair we
store the reference the current constructor has been called to initialize and the reference
to the fully initialized object. Since in the beginning there will be no fully initialized
object, we will store Null in that case. To avoid annoying type conversions, we work
with values val instead of references (although we will only be using addresses and
Null). So frame is now:
frame = opstack × locvars × cname × sig × nat × (val × val)
The de!nition of frame applies to all methods, but only constructors will use the addi-
tional component, all other methods will simply ignore it. Adding the iheap extension
we !nally get the new state space of the Java VM:
jvm-state= xcpt option × aheap × iheap × frame list
iheap= loc ⇒ init-ty
With this in mind we can take a look at how the formal de!nition of the operational
semantics changes. The only interesting instructions are New, Invoke-spcl, and Return.
The rules for the other instructions get two new parameters, ihp for initialization status
and z for the reference update in constructors, but they simply pass them on. The rule
for Load for instance looks like this:
exec-instr (Load idx) hp ihp stk vars Cl sig pc z frs =
(None; hp; ihp; ((vars ! idx) # stk; vars; Cl ; sig; pc+1; z)#frs)
For the New instruction we have to record that freshly created objects are com-
pletely uninitialized. Apart from that everything remains the same (see also Section 4.2,
p. 17):
exec-instr (New C) hp ihp stk vars Cl sig pc z frs =
let (ref ;xp ′) = new-Addr hp;
hp ′ = if xp ′=None then hp(ref := Some (blank C)) else hp;
ihp ′ = if xp ′=None then ihp(ref := UnInit C pc) else ihp ′;
stk ′ = if xp ′=None then (Addr ref )#stk else stk
in (xp ′; hp ′; ihp ′; (stk ′; vars; Cl ; sig; pc+1; z)#frs)
610 G. Klein, T. Nipkow / Theoretical Computer Science 298 (2003) 583–626
The de!nition of Invoke-spcl is new:
exec-instr (Invoke-spcl C mn ps) hp ihp stk vars Cl sig pc z frs =
let n = size ps;
args = take n stk;
ref = stk!n;
x1 = raise-xcpt (ref=Null) NullPointer;
D = fst(the(hp the-Addr ref ));
(dc; ; ; mxl ; ) = the (method (;C) (mn;ps));
(a ′;x2) = new-Addr hp;
xp ′ = if x1 = None then x2 else x1;
hp ′ = hp(a ′ := Some (blank D));
T = if C = Object then Init (Class D) else PartInit C;
z ′ = if C = Object then (Addr a ′; Addr a ′) else (Addr a ′; Null);
frs ′ = if xp ′=None then [] else
[([];(Addr a ′)#(rev args)@(replicate mxl arbitrary);dc;(mn;ps);0;z ′)]
in (xp ′; hp ′; ihp(a ′:= T); frs ′@(stk; vars; Cl ; sig; pc; z)#frs)
The beginning is the same as Invoke: in args we store the actual parameters of the
constructor call. The reference on which to invoke the constructor is the next element
on the stack after the parameters. If it is Null, a NullPointer exception is thrown.
Still as in Invoke we retrieve the dynamic type D of the object the reference ref
points to, but this time we do not use it for a dynamic method lookup; we do a static
method lookup instead, with the parameters C (the class), mn (the method name), and
ps (the list of parameter types) of the Invoke-spcl instruction. Then we create a new
object: as in the New instruction, we request a free location, handle the OutOfMemory
exception should one occur, and assign a blank object to the new address with the same
dynamic type as the one at ref (in eQect, we copy the object at ref to the new address
Addr a ′).
Now we come to the init status ihp ′: the new object gets type PartInit C since the
constructor for class C has just been invoked, and the next constructor to be invoked
must be one in the superclass of C. If C has no superclass, i.e. if C=Object then we
have reached the end of the constructor chain and can view the new object as fully
initialized. After this its !elds and methods are accessible, !rst from the constructor
body of class Object, then in turn from each constructor in the call chain. At this point
we also have to store in the frame of the new constructor the pair z ′ that tells which
reference the constructor is supposed to initialize and with which reference to replace
ref when it is !nished. The former is the new object at Addr a ′. The latter we do
not know yet, so we set it to Null. Only if we have reached Object, we know that
our newly created object is also the !nal one that will replace all intermediate objects
in the call chain. In this setting we construct the call frame of the constructor to be
invoked just as the normal Invoke does.
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The Return instruction now additionally handles the reference update at constructor
returns:
exec-instr Return hp ihp stk0 vars Cl sig0 pc z0 frs =
if frs=[] then (None; hp; ihp; []) else
let (stk;loc;C ;sig;pc;z) = hd frs;
val = hd stk0;
(mn;ps) = sig0;
(a;b) = z0;
n = size ps;
args = take n stk;
addr = stk!n;
drpstk = drop (n+1) stk;
stk ′ = if mn=init then val#(replace addr b drpstk) else val#drpstk;
loc ′ = if mn=init then replace addr b loc else loc;
z ′ = if mn=init ∧ z = (addr;Null) then (addr;b) else z
in (None; hp; ihp; (stk ′;loc ′;C ;sig;pc+1;z ′)#tl frs))
We will !rst take another look at the parameters: stk0, sig0 and z0 are the stack, the
signature and the reference update pair of the current call frame, i.e. the own method.
As in Section 4.2, we extract the return value val, our own method name mn and our
own list of formal parameter types ps. Then we drop the actual parameters from the
stack in the caller frame. If we are not in a constructor, i.e. if our own method name
mn is not init, we just put the return value on top of the stack in the caller frame and
are done. If we are returning from a constructor, however, we use replace to substitute
the now initialized object b (the second component of our reference update pair) for
the address of the original object addr. This replacement must occur everywhere on
the stack and in the local variables of the caller frame to delete all references to
the original object. If the caller frame belongs to a constructor that is initializing the
same object as we are, we also have to modify the second component of its reference
update pair z to the initialized object b.
5.3. Bytecode veri=cation
Since we already de!ned types for object initialization in Section 5.1 we now only
have to construct a semilattice for them and change the transfer function accordingly
to instantiate the BCV.
The ordering of the semilattice is canonical: PartInit and UnInit are only related to
themselves, for Init t we use the old 4. Formally:
Init t14i Init t2 = t1 4 t2
a 4i b = (a = b)
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The carrier set is constructed easily and the supremum operation again follows the
ordering canonically:
init-tys≡ {Init x| x ∈ (types G)} ∪ {x | ∃C n: x = UnInit C n} ∪
{x | ∃C : x = PartInit C}
sup (Init t1) (Init t2) = case JType:sup t1 t2 of
Err ⇒ Err | OK x ⇒ OK (Init x)
sup a b = if a = b then OK a else Err
With this we de!ne Init:esl ≡ (init-tys; 4i ; sup) as the err-semilattice for init-ty and
arrive at:
Lemma 11. If  is wellformed then Init:esl is an err-semilattice.
If we repeat the construction in Section 4.3, we get:
stk-esl :: nat ⇒ init-ty list esl
stk-esl mxs ≡ upto-esl mxs Init:esl
reg-sl :: nat ⇒ init-ty err list sl
reg-sl mxr ≡ Listn:sl mxr (Err:sl Init:esl)
sl :: nat ⇒ nat ⇒ state-bool option err sl
sl mxs mxr ≡ Err:sl(Opt:esl(Product:esl (Product:esl
(stk-esl mxs) (Err:esl(reg-sl mxr))) (TrivLat:esl::bool esl)))
where TrivLat: esl :: bool is the trivial err-semilattice (with= as ordering) applied to
type bool.
Lemma 12. If  is wellformed then sl is also a semilattice.
The second ingredient to the BCV is the transfer function. In Figs. 7 and 8 we
de!ne eA ′ and app ′ for init-ty. They both work on state-type (where ty is replaced
by init-ty), and do not involve the bool and option component yet.
Compared to the original version in Figs. 4 (p. 24) and 3 (p. 23), both de!nitions
have become a bit larger, but remained the same in structure. With pc, the program
counter of the current instruction, they receive one more implicit parameter.
In eA ′ the instructions Load, Store, Put=eld, Ifcmpeq, Goto, Return, and Dup
remain unchanged; the instructions LitPush, Get=eld, CheckCast, IAdd, and Invoke
now explicitly yield initialized values. The instructions Invoke-spcl and New are more
interesting.
Invoke-spcl is similar to Invoke, but it can only be used on uninitialized references
(which is checked in app). After the constructor returns, the reference will be fully
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eA ′ :: instr × state-type ⇒ state-type
eA ′ (Load idx; (st; lt)) = (ok-val (lt!idx)#st; lt)
eA ′ (Store idx; (t#st; lt)) = (st; lt[idx:= OK t])
eA ′ (LitPush v; (st; lt)) = (Init (the (typeof v))#st; lt)
eA ′ (Get=eld F C ;(t#st; lt)) = (Init (snd (the (=eld (;C) F )))#st;lt)
eA ′ (Put=eld F C ; (t1#t2#st; lt)) = (st;lt)
eA ′ (New C ; (st;lt)) = (UnInit C pc#st;
replace (OK (UnInit C pc)) Err lt)
eA ′ (Checkcast C ; (t#st;lt)) = (Init (Class C) # st;lt)
eA ′ (Dup; (t#st;lt)) = (t#t#st;lt)
eA ′ (IAdd ; t1#t2#st;lt)) = (Init (PrimT Integer)#st;lt)
eA ′ (Ifcmpeq b; (t1#t2#st;lt)) = (st;lt)
eA ′ (Goto b; s) = s
eA ′ (Return; s) = s
eA ′ (Invoke C mn ps; (st;lt)) = let st ′ = drop (1+size ps) st;
( ;rt; ; ; ) = the (method (;C) (mn;ps))
in (Init rt#st ′; lt)
eA ′ (Invoke-spcl C mn ps; (st;lt)) = let t = st!size ps;
i = Init (theClass t);
st ′′ = drop (1+size ps) st;
st ′ = replace t i st ′′;
lt ′ = replace (OK t) (OK i) lt;
( ;rt; ; ; ) = the (method (;C) (mn;ps))
in (Init rt#st ′; lt ′)
Fig. 7. EQect of instructions on the state type with object initialization.
initialized, so the Invoke-spcl rule replaces the uninitialized type t with an initialized
one of the same class (theClass :: ini-ty⇒ ty satis!es theClass (PartInit C)=Class C
and theClass (UnInit C pc)=Class C). The replacement again happens everywhere
in the stack and local variables.
The New instruction seems easy at !rst sight: if a New C is at position pc, it
produces the type UnInit C pc. The rule in Fig. 7 does a bit more, though. For the
alias analysis to be correct, there must not be any former instances of the type UnInit
C pc with the same pc on the stack or in the local variables. We take care of this with
the replace for local variables in eA ′ and with checking for UnInit C pc on the stack in
app ′. Sun’s JVM speci!cation solves the problem by disallowing all backwards jumps
as long as there is any UnInit type anywhere on the stack or in the local variables. This
is correct, but somewhat drastic: although the restriction is not severe for programming
in Java, it rejects an unnecessary large number of type safe programs. At the same time
it is hard to reason about, because it makes assumptions about the data7ow analysis
itself and not only about properties of the resulting welltyping. Freund leaves the local
variables untouched, but checks for UnInit in app (if we translate his notation into
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app ′ :: instr × state-type ⇒ bool
app ′ (Load idx; (st;lt)) = idx ¡ lt ∧ lt!idx = Err ∧
size st ¡ mxs
app ′ (Store idx; (t#st;lt)) = idx ¡ size lt
app ′ (LitPush v; (st;lt)) = size st ¡ mxs ∧ typeof v = None
app ′ (Get=eld F C ; (t#st;lt)) = is-class  C ∧ t 4i Init (Class C) ∧
(∃ t ′: =eld (;C) F = Some (C ; t ′))
app ′ (Put=eld F C ; (t1#t2#st;lt)) = is-class  C ∧
(∃ t ′: =eld (;C) F = Some (C ;t ′) ∧
t2 4i Init (Class C) ∧ t1 4i Init t ′)
app ′ (New C ; (st;lt)) = is-class  C ∧ size st ¡ mxs ∧
UnInit C pc =∈ set st
app ′ (Checkcast C ; t#st;lt)) = is-class  C ∧ (∃ r: t = Init (RefT r))
app ′ (Dup; (t#st;lt)) = 1+size st ¡ mxs
app ′ (IAdd ; (t1#t2#st;lt)) = t1 = t2 ∧ t1 = Init (PrimT Integer)
app ′ (Ifcmpeq b; (t1#t2#st;lt)) = t1 = t2 ∨ (∃ r r ′: t1 = Init (RefT r) ∧
t2 = Init (RefT r ′))
app ′ (Goto b; s) = True
app ′ (Return; (t#st;lt)) = t 4i Init rt
app ′ (Invoke C mn ps; (st;lt)) = size ps ¡ size st ∧ mn = init ∧
method (;C) (mn;ps) = None ∧
let as = rev (take (size ps) st);
t = st!size ps
in t 4i Init (Class C) ∧ is-class  C ∧
(∀ (a;f )∈set(zip as ps): a 4i Init f )
app ′ (Invoke-spcl C mn ps; (st;lt)) = size ps ¡ size st ∧ mn = init ∧
(∃ r: method (;C) (mn;ps) = Some (C ;r)) ∧
let as = rev (take (size ps) st);
t = st!size ps
in is-class  C ∧
((∃ pc: t = UnInit C pc) ∨
t = PartInit C ′ ∧ (C ′;C) ∈ subcl ) ∧
(∀ (a;f )∈set(zip as ps): a 4i (Init f ))
Fig. 8. Applicability of instructions with object initialization.
our framework). This has the drawback of not being monotone (more speci!cally the
local variable part of app would not be monotone).
We use the solution of [23]; it yields a monotone transfer function, admits as many
programs and is still safe. In fact, here replace is the identity function, because the
!rst path to New in the data7ow analysis cannot contain UnInit C pc (because only
the instruction at pc creates the type UnInit C pc). A merge with subsequent paths
that might contain UnInit C pc would already give Err without replace. This fact
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is diUcult to prove formally, because it again involves reasoning about the data7ow
analysis (paths); just looking at the welltyping is not enough.
Since eA ′ does not yet include the new bool component of state-bool, we need one
more lifting step. The purpose of the bool part in the state type is to mark whether
a constructor has already called its superclass constructor. We set it to True when
we call Invoke-spcl for a partly initialized type (app checks that it is the superclass
constructor), otherwise we leave it untouched:
eA-bool :: instr ⇒ state-bool ⇒ state-bool
eA-bool i ((st;lt);z) ≡
(eA ′ (i;(st;lt));
if ∃C m p D: i = Invoke-spcl C m p ∧ st!size p = PartInit D then True else z)
eA :: instr ⇒ state-bool option ⇒ state-bool option
eA i pc ≡ option-map (eA-bool i pc)
The de!nition of app ′ in Fig. 8 looks intimidating, but compared to Fig. 3 the changes
are again small: Load, Store, LitPush, Dup and Goto are the same. Get=eld, Put=eld,
CheckCast, IAdd, Ifcmpeq, and Return only restrict their arguments to initialized
types. New we have already mentioned in the discussion of its eA ′ rule. Normal
method invocation is also restricted to initialized objects (for the parameters as well as
for the object on which to invoke the method). Additionally, the method must not be
a constructor. Finally, there is the new rule for Invoke-spcl. It is similar to Invoke, but
here we make sure that we actually call a constructor (mn= init). Since it is supposed
to be a static method invocation, the method dictionary method must yield an entry
telling us that the method is de!ned in class C (and not in a superclass of it). The
rule ensures that the type t of the object on which to invoke the constructor is either
completely uninitialized, or partly initialized. If it is uninitialized it must be of type
UnInit C pc (for some pc)—only then are we allowed to invoke the C constructor.
If it is partly initialized it must be of type PartInit C ′ (where the implicit parameter
C ′ is the class we are currently verifying). This is because if it is partly initialized,
then we are verifying a constructor (only there may partly initialized objects occur).
It must be initialized up to exactly C ′, because for any class D the type PartInit D
may only occur in D constructors. The only thing a constructor may do with partly
initialized objects is invoke the superclass constructor on them—so C must be the
direct superclass of C ′. The JVM speci!cation also allows to call another constructor
of the own class, not only one of the superclass. In practice this is convenient, in
our formalization it would just add one more uninteresting case (where C=C ′) to all
proofs about Invoke-spcl.
Again, we have to lift app ′ to the new bool component and then the option type.
This time we do it in one step: for None we again get True, for Some !rst app ′ must
be satis!ed, then we have two additional conditions on the superclass-constructor-has-
been-called marker z:
app :: instr ⇒ state-bool option ⇒ bool
app i s ≡ case s of None ⇒ True | Some t ⇒
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let ((st;lt);z) = t in
app ′ (i;(st;lt)) ∧
mn = init →
((i = Return → z) ∧
(∀C m p: i = Invoke-spcl C m p ∧ st!size p = PartInit C ′ → ¬z))
If we are verifying a constructor then at each Return instruction the marker must be
True, and at each Invoke-spcl for partly initialized objects the marker must be False
(we may call the superclass constructor only once; C ′ is again the current class).
With case distinction over the instruction set, we get:
Lemma 13. eA and app are monotone.
The instantiation of Kildall’s algorithm remains the same, it just works with other
abstract execution functions eA and app and a slightly diQerent type system. The only
thing we need to adjust is the start value of the iteration.
wt-kil ≡
bounded (n: succs (ins!n) n) (size ins) ∧ 0 ¡ size ins ∧
let t = OK (if mn = init ∧ C = Object then PartInit C else Init (Class C));
S0 = Some (([];t#(map (OK ◦ Init) ps))@(replicate mxl Err));C=Object);
’0 = (OK S0)#(replicate (size ins−1) (OK None))
in ∀ n ¡ size ins: (kiljvm ’0)!n = Err
The this pointer t (local variable 0) is a bit more complicated than before: if we verify
a constructor, and if it is not the constructor of class Object then the this pointer is
only partly initialized yet—the superclass constructor has to be called before it can
be used. Otherwise, if it is a normal method or if it is class Object, we may assume
that the this pointer is an initialized object. The only new thing in the rest of the start
value is that we may also assume that the parameters only contain initialized values.
Since our type system is a semilattice, the ordering meets the ascending chain con-
dition when  is wellformed, step built of eA and app is monotone and preserves the
carrier set, we get from Theorem 1:
Lemma 14. If  is wellformed and succs is bounded by the number of instructions
then kiljvm is a bytecode veri=er.
When we also replace OK (Class C) in wt-start by t as in wt-kil, we obtain the
desired connection between BCV and welltypings:
Theorem 15. If a program  is wellformed and wt-kil holds for a method, then the
method is type correct w.r.t. wt-method.
Let us revisit what we needed to do in this section to instantiate the framework
for the new type system. The largest piece of work were the new de!nitions of eA
and app. They are necessary anyway, they not only de!ne the executable BCV the
framework provides, but they also describe the welltypings we will need in the type
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safety proof. The additional work was the semilattice construction, the proof that eA
and app are monotone, and the proof that eA and app preserve the carrier set. The
latter two proofs are case distinctions on the instruction set and are handled very well
by Isabelle’s automatic tactics (with a few relatively easy lemmas about the new types).
The semilattice constructions were straightforward since Init :esl is easy and for the
rest we could use the theories of Section 2.
We may summarize that while it is considerable work to extend a large formalization
by a new feature, the BCV framework presented here handles these changes very well.
Due to its modularity and abstractness the amount of additional work needed for the
framework is very small in comparison to a monolithic development.
5.4. Type safety
In this section we investigate if the BCV with object initialization really does what
we expect it to do. The type safety proof is still an invariant proof as in Section
4.3.4 and the main theorem is still that in welltyped programs execution preserves the
invariant. The proof itself, a case distinction over the instruction set, is large, but it is
not the hard part. The challenge is !nding the right invariant.
The invariant should ensure that runtime types are approximated correctly by the
static welltyping. With object initialization we also want the new iheap component of
the Java VM state to agree with the initialization status the BCV predicts. This is the
property that tells us that objects are initialized correctly.
As it is common in invariant proofs, we need to strengthen these goals for the proof
to succeed. In the previous sections we extended our model by three things: the new
types UnInit and PartInit, the iheap, and the reference updates at constructor returns
(because we create a new object at each constructor call). It is not surprising that the
invariant needs to formally describe the purpose of these extensions. Apart from the
relation of the iheap to the statically predicted initialization status, this is captured by
the following two properties:
• The alias analysis that the BCV does on uninitialized values must be correct. We
created the type UnInit C pc to keep track of a single value: the reference to
the object that was freshly created by the instruction New C at address pc. Also
the type PartInit C is intended to keep track of a single value: the this pointer in
constructors. The predicate consistent-init stk loc s ihp (see Section A.2) states that
each type UnInit C pc and PartInit C in a state type s refers to at most one value
in stack and local variables.
• The BCV and the operational semantics must agree on the new objects that are
created for constructor calls and on the reference update that we do at constructor
returns. The former is part of correct-frame, the latter is described by constructor-ok.
In Section A.2, we show both predicates in more detail.
The formal de!nitions of these additional properties are hard to understand, but we
do not need to go into further detail at this point: it is not necessary to understand
them in order to trust the proof. It is enough, and more important, to understand the
de!nition of type approximation, since this is the original goal we wanted to prove.
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The invariant implies that it holds. In the following we show how to extend the notion
of type approximation such that it covers object initialization.
The basic building block is single value conformance. A value v conforms to a type
T, if it has the dynamic type T ′ and T ′4T. The function typeof :: aheap⇒ val⇒ ty
option looks up the dynamic type of objects in the heap (for other values, dynamic
and static type are always equal):
(-  - ::4 -) :: aheap ⇒ val ⇒ ty ⇒ bool
hp  v ::4 T ≡ ∃T ′: typeof hp v = Some T ′ ∧ T ′ 4 T
We extend it to take the new iheap and init-ty into account by declaring a new
judgment hp; ih  v ::4i T :
hp;ih  v ::4i T ≡
case T of Init t ⇒ hp  v::4 t ∧ is-init hp ih v
| UnInit C pc ⇒ hp  v::4 Class C ∧
typeof hp v = Some C ∧ tag ih v = Some T
| PartInit C ⇒ hp  v::4 Class C ∧ tag ih v = Some T
For initialized types we just use the existing ::4 and require with is-init that the value
is initialized. For UnInit C pc and PartInit C we require that v approximates the type
Class C, and that the iheap exactly agrees with the predicted type (tag ih v returns
Some T if the value v is an address tagged with type T in ih). In the UnInit case we
can be more precise: since UnInit C pc is only used for freshly created objects, we
know that the static type is exact. We call a value v initialized (is-init hp ih v) if it is
not an address, or for addresses that really point to an object, if the iheap ih contains
a tag Init t for it.
tag :: iheap ⇒ val ⇒ init-ty option
tag ih v ≡ if ∃ l : v = Addr l then Some (ih (the-Addr v)) else None
is-init :: aheap ⇒ iheap ⇒ val ⇒ bool
is-init hp ih v ≡ ∀ loc: v = Addr loc → hp loc = None → (∃ t: ih loc = Init t)
Using ::4i we now de!ne what it means for a welltyping of stack and local variables
to approximate a concrete stack and set of local variables:
approx-val :: aheap ⇒ iheap ⇒ val ⇒ init-ty err ⇒ bool
approx-val hp ih v any ≡ case any of Err ⇒ True | OK T ⇒ hp;ih  v ::4i T
approx-loc :: aheap ⇒ iheap ⇒ locvars ⇒ ty err list ⇒ bool
approx-loc hp ih loc lt ≡ list-all2 (approx-val hp ih) loc lt
approx-stk :: aheap ⇒ iheap ⇒ opstack ⇒ ty list ⇒ bool
approx-stk hp ih stk st ≡ approx-loc hp ih stk (map OK st)
In Section A.1 the invariant correct-state implies that the heap is consistent, i.e. that
all objects on the heap only have !elds according to their declared type. Now, we also
need an h-init hp ihp to say that the !elds of all objects contain fully initialized values.
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Both have the same structure: in h-init we say that for each object that is de!ned in
the heap hp and each !eld f of these objects, is-init hp ihp f must hold. See Section
A.2 for the formal de!nition.
These are the properties the invariant must express. The complete invariant is the
predicate correct-state shown in Section A.2. Since it is quite large, complex, and
therefore not obvious in its semantics, we need to ask ourselves if that really is what we
want to prove about the BCV, if it ensures proper object initialization and type safety
of bytecode. Fortunately, as already mentioned above, we do not have to understand
the whole invariant to trust it. We proved the following lemma.
Lemma 16. If the invariant holds, dynamic types during execution and the initializa-
tion status of all objects are correctly approximated by the welltyping:
correct-state (None;hp;ihp;(stk;loc;C ;sig;pc;r)#frs)  →
∃ st lt z:  C sig = Some ((st;lt);z) ∧
approx-stk hp ihp stk st ∧ approx-loc hp ihp loc lt
The actual type safety theorem for Java with object initialization is again:
Theorem 17. In a welltyped and wellformed program, execution preserves the
invariant:
wt-jvm-prog  ∧ correct-state s  ∧ s jvm→ t → correct-state t 
The Isabelle proof of that theorem is about 3100 lines long (not counting lemmas
about the type system) and consists mainly of a large case distinction over the in-
struction set together with a wealth of lemmas about the invariant. The same proof
without object initialization only took about 1000 lines. Of these 1000 lines about 600
could be replayed after slight adjustments. The reusable part consisted of lemmas about
the invariant (more speci!cally about its individual parts) and of the general structure
of the type safety proof. The detailed reasoning for individual instructions had to be
changed due to the stronger properties to prove. The additional work is mostly due to
the new parts of the invariant adding not only in size but also in complexity. Especially
the alias analysis predicate consistent-init causes an increase in proof size: since it is
designed to keep track of single values, each kind of instruction required its own set
of lemmas (which was not necessary for the rest of the invariant).
Freund presents a similar proof of type safety in his Ph.D. thesis [8]. While Freund’s
model as a whole is sound and at least the theorems we have looked at more closely
all hold, it still contains some subtle problems (as the non-monotonicity of the typing
rule for New) as well as small errors in the proofs (for instance an incomplete case
distinction in Lemma D.16.16). We are not trying to !nd fault in Freund’s thesis;
however, for a formal development of this size done by hand it is of remarkably high
quality. Rather, the point is that exactly in a large and complex formal development
there are bound to be human errors, and these are addressed by theorem provers like
Isabelle. Isabelle not only does not allow you to make errors in proofs, its automatic
tactics also have become powerful enough to help with the technical detail. Another
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eQect of a strict, mechanical formal development is that speci!cations get validated
more thoroughly: a single non-monotone rule in the speci!cation is easy to overlook
and skip over and thus might not turn up as a problem in hand proofs about the
speci!cation. In a theorem prover these kinds of inconsistencies turn up quickly. They
also can be !xed more easily and safely because it is easy to see which properties are
still valid and which are aQected by the change.
6. Conclusion
By verifying an executable BCV, this work closes a signi!cant gap in the eQort
to provide a machine-checked formalization of the Java=JVM architecture. Despite its
relative compactness (the abstract executable BCV is about 2000 lines of speci!cations,
programs, and proofs), the amount of work to construct such a detailed model should
not be underestimated. But when it comes to security, there is no substitute for complete
formality and tools like Isabelle are very well suited to support it.
We have demonstrated that our abstract formalization of the executable BCV in-
tegrates well with our existing work about Java and the JVM. As promised in [17]
we included a more realistic feature, object initialization, in our model. We proved
that the BCV framework copes well with such signi!cant changes in the type system
(Java was about 9000 lines of Isabelle code before and 11500 lines after adding
object initialization).
Including exception handling in the formalization is not diUcult; in fact we have
already done so [1], but leave it out here for clarity. The complication with exceptions
is that two successors of the same instruction can have diQerent result state types in
the data7ow analysis (one for normal execution, a diQerent one when an exception
occurs). The idea is to change the type of the transfer function such that it yields a
list of pairs each consisting of successor instruction and state type.
The JSR instruction is the next challenge on our agenda.
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Appendix A. Conformance relation
A.1. Conformance without object initialization
This section shows the formal de!nition of the conformance relation between dy-
namic JVM states and static types in the Java model without object initialization. It
is explained in detail in [19,20], so we will be brief here.
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A heap conforms if all objects conform. An object conforms if all !elds conform
to their declared type. The function =elds takes a program and a class and yields a
function that maps !eld names to their declared type. For the de!nition of single value
conformance hp v ::4T see Section 5.4, p. 39.
lconf :: aheap ⇒ ( ⇒ val option) ⇒ ( ⇒ ty option) ⇒ bool
lconf hp vs Ts ≡
∀ n T : Ts n = Some T → (∃ v: vs n = Some v ∧ hp  v ::4 T)
oconf :: aheap ⇒ obj ⇒ bool
oconf hp (C ;fs) ≡ lconf hp fs (=elds (;C))
(-
√
) :: aheap ⇒ bool
hp
√ ≡ ∀ a obj: hp a = Some obj → oconf hp obj
Single value conformance is lifted to a register set and stack by approx-loc and
approx-stk. Any value conforms to the unusable type Err.
approx-val :: aheap ⇒ val ⇒ init-ty err ⇒ bool
approx-val hp v any ≡ case any of Err ⇒ True | OK T ⇒ hp  v ::4 T
approx-loc :: aheap ⇒ locvars ⇒ ty err list ⇒ bool
approx-loc hp loc lt ≡ list-all2 (approx-val hp) loc lt
approx-stk :: aheap ⇒ opstack ⇒ ty list ⇒ bool
approx-stk hp stk st ≡ approx-loc hp stk (map OK st)
A call frame conforms, if its stack and register set conform, the program counter lies
inside the instruction list, and if the register set has space for the this pointer, the
method parameters, and the local variables.
correct-frame :: aheap ⇒ state-type ⇒ nat ⇒ instr list ⇒ frame ⇒ bool
correct-frame hp (st;lt) mxl ins (stk;loc;C ;sig;pc) ≡
approx-stk hp stk st ∧ approx-loc hp loc lt ∧
pc ¡ size ins ∧ size loc = size (snd sig)+mxl+1
The following de!nition uses prog-type= cname⇒ sig⇒method-type which lifts
method-type to whole programs. The predicate describes the structure of the call frame
stack beneath the topmost frame. The parameters rt0 and sig0 are the return type and
signature of the topmost frame. A list of call frames conforms if it is empty. If it is
not empty, the head frame is investigated more closely: the current state type  C
sig ! pc must denote a reachable instruction; the call frame must belong to a de!ned
method; it must be halted at an Invoke instruction which created the call frame above
(this is not easily expressed, but we can demand that mn and ps stem form sig0, that
the return type of a static lookup on C ′ conforms to the one from the frame above
(rt0), and that the current stack is large enough to hold the actual parameters plus
the object on which the method was invoked); !nally the current frame and the rest
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of the call frame stack must conform.
correct-frames :: aheap ⇒ prog-type ⇒ ty ⇒ sig ⇒ frame list ⇒ bool
correct-frames hp  rt0 sig0 [] = True
correct-frames hp  rt0 sig0 (f #frs) =
let (stk;loc;C ;sig;pc) = f ; (mn;ps) = sig0 in
∃ st lt rt mxs mxl ins C ′:
 C sig ! pc = Some (st;lt) ∧ is-class  C ∧
method (;C) sig = Some(C ;rt;mxs;mxl ;ins) ∧
ins!pc = Invoke C ′ mn ps ∧
(∃D ′ rt ′ b ′: method (;C ′) sig0 = Some(D ′;rt ′;b ′) ∧ rt0 4 rt ′) ∧
(∃ as t st ′: st = (rev as)@t#st ′ ∧ size as = size ps ∧
correct-frame hp (st;lt) mxl ins f ∧
correct-frames hp  rt sig frs)
The following is the toplevel conformance relation between a state and a program
type. The !rst two cases are trivial, the third case requires a conformant heap (hp√
), contains special handling for the topmost call frame and delegates the rest to
correct-frames. The topmost frame is special because it does not need to be halted
at an Invoke instruction. The topmost frame must conform and the current state type
must denote a reachable instruction. The method lookup provides correct-frame and
correct-frames with the required parameters.
correct-state :: jvm-state ⇒ prog-type ⇒ bool
correct-state (Some xp;hp;frs)  = True
correct-state (None;hp;[])  = True
correct-state (None;hp;f #fs)  =
let (stk;loc;C ;sig;pc) = f in
∃ rt mxs mxl ins s:
method (;C) sig = Some(C ;rt;mxs;mxl ;ins) ∧  C sig ! pc = Some s ∧
correct-frame hp s mxl ins f ∧ correct-frames hp  rt sig fs ∧
hp
√ ∧ is-class  C
A.2. Conformance with object initialization
This section shows the full de!nition of the conformance relation as far as it not
already appeared in Section 5.4.
We begin with the de!nition of h-init: all objects only have !elds with initialized
values. The structure is analogous to heap conformance (see Section A.1):
l-init :: aheap ⇒ iheap ⇒ ( ⇒ val option) ⇒ ( ⇒ ty option) ⇒ bool
l-init hp ih vs Ts ≡
∀ n T : Ts n = Some T → (∃ v: vs n = Some v ∧ is-init hp ih v)
o-init :: aheap ⇒ iheap ⇒ obj ⇒ bool
o-init hp ih (C ;fs) ≡ l-init hp ih fs (=elds (;C))
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h-init :: aheap ⇒ iheap ⇒ bool
h-init hp ih ≡ ∀ a obj: hp a = Some obj → o-init hp ih obj
The next component of the conformance relation regards the alias analysis on unini-
tialized objects. This part follows closely the description in [8].
The basic idea of the judgment consistent-init is: if the static local variables or the
stack (on the type level) contain two entries UnInit C pc then the corresponding entries
in the dynamic local variables and stack (on the value level) must contain the same
value. Otherwise the BCV might mistakenly mark uninitialized values as initialized at
Invoke-spcl. The other direction does not hold necessarily: if two values are equal,
they do not need to have the same type (one could be UnInit C pc the other Err).
We also require that all uninitialized values are tagged correctly in the ihp.
corr-loc :: locvars ⇒ ty err list ⇒ iheap ⇒ val ⇒ init-ty ⇒ bool
corr-loc loc lt ihp v T ≡
list-all2 (l t: t = OK T → l = v ∧ tag ihp v = Some T) loc lt
corr-stk :: opstack ⇒ ty list ⇒ iheap ⇒ val ⇒ init-ty ⇒ bool
corr-stk stk st ihp v T ≡ corr-loc stk (map OK st) ihp v T
corresponds :: opstack ⇒ locvars ⇒ state-type ⇒ iheap ⇒ val ⇒ init-ty ⇒ bool
corresponds stk loc s ihp v T ≡
corr-stk stk (fst s) ihp v T ∧ corr-loc loc (snd s) ihp v T
consistent-init :: opstack ⇒ locvars ⇒ state-type ⇒ iheap ⇒ bool
consistent-init stk loc s ihp ≡
(∀C pc: ∃ v: corresponds stk loc s ihp v (UnInit C pc) ) ∧
(∀C : ∃ v: corresponds stk loc s ihp v (PartInit C) )
With these de!nitions we can de!ne conformance of call frames as follows: stack and
register set conform, the alias analysis is correct, the type PartInit is only used for
the this pointer in constructors, the this pointer in constructors is tagged correctly, the
pc is inside the method, and the size of the register set is correct:
correct-frame :: aheap ⇒ iheap ⇒ state-type ⇒ nat ⇒ instr list ⇒ frame ⇒ bool
correct-frame hp ih (st;lt) mxl ins (stk;loc;C ;sig;pc;(this;c)) ≡
approx-stk hp ih stk st ∧ approx-loc hp ih loc lt ∧
consistent-init stk loc (st;lt) ih ∧
(fst sig = init →
corresponds stk loc (st;lt) ih this (PartInit C) ∧
(∃C ′: typeof hp this = Some C ′ ∧
tag ih this ∈ {Some (PartInit C); Some (Init (Class C ′))})) ∧
pc ¡ size ins ∧ size loc=size(snd sig)+mxl+1
The predicate constructor-ok describes the stored references in constructor call
chains. It does not describe the situation completely, though. Only if we take into
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account that the program is welltyped, i.e. that app holds for every instruction, do
we get the whole picture. To achieve this, constructor-ok relates the following three
references:
• The this pointer a of the calling constructor (of frame n). That is the reference
originally to be initialized. Since at that point the initialization process cannot be
complete, it must have the iheap tag UnInit or PartInit.
• The this pointer b of the current constructor (of frame n+1). This is the reference to
the object that was arti!cially created for this constructor call. It is one step further
in the initialization chain and must therefore be tagged with PartInit or Init (Init,
only if we have reached the end of the chain and arrived at Object). We require that
if the tag is PartInit then it must be PartInit C where C is the current class, and
if it is some Init (Class D) then D from the iheap must be equal to the dynamic
type C ′ from the heap.
That b is exactly one step further and only initialized if the current class is Object
can be inferred from app and the start value of the BCV.
• The reference c to the fully initialized object. It will be passed up along the initial-
ization chain by the Return instructions in constructors (see also the semantics of the
Return instruction in Section 5.2). The reference can be Null when the superclass
constructor has not been called yet. More speci!cally it will exactly be Null as long
as the superclass-constructor-has-been-called marker z of the BCV is false. If it is
not Null then it must point to an initialized object of type C ′.
All three references have to agree on the dynamic type C ′ of the object (since it is
the same object copied around). Formally this lengthy text reads as:
constructor-ok :: aheap ⇒ iheap ⇒ val ⇒ cname ⇒ bool ⇒ val × val ⇒ bool
constructor-ok hp ih a C z (b; c) ≡
∃C ′ D pc: z = (c =Null) ∧
typeof hp a = Some C ′ ∧ typeof hp b = Some C ′ ∧
(c =Null → typeof hp c = Some C ′) ∧
tag ih a ∈ {Some (UnInit C ′ pc); Some (PartInit D)} ∧
tag ih b ∈ {Some (PartInit C); Some (Init (Class C ′))} ∧
(c =Null → tag ih c = Some (Init (Class C ′)))
The rest of the invariant proceeds much as in Section A.1, we merely have inserted
constructor-ok and adjusted for Invoke-special. The parameters rt0, sig0, z0, r0 stem
from the call frame above the current f :
correct-frames :: aheap ⇒ iheap ⇒ prog-type ⇒ ty ⇒ sig ⇒ bool ⇒
val × val ⇒ frame list ⇒ bool
correct-frames hp ih  rt0 sig0 z0 r0 [] = True
correct-frames hp ih  rt0 sig0 z0 r0 (f #frs) =
let (stk;loc;C ;sig;pc;r) = f ; (mn;ps) = sig0 in
∃ st lt z rt mxs mxl ins C ′:
 C sig ! pc = Some ((st;lt);z) ∧ is-class  C ∧
method (;C) sig = Some(C ;rt;mxs;mxl ;ins) ∧
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ins!pc ∈ {Invoke C ′ mn ps; Invoke-special C ′ mn ps} ∧
(∃D ′ rt ′ b ′: method (;C ′) sig0 = Some(D ′;rt ′;b ′) ∧ rt0 4 rt ′) ∧
(∃ as t st ′: st = (rev as)@t#st ′ ∧ size as = size ps ∧
(mn = init → constructor-ok hp ih (stk!size as) C ′ z0 r0) ∧
correct-frame hp ih (st;lt) mxl ins f ∧
correct-frames hp ih  rt sig z r frs)
To the toplevel conformance predicate we add the new h-init, the rest of the de!nition
is the same as in Section A.1:
correct-state :: jvm-state ⇒ prog-type ⇒ bool
correct-state (Some xp;hp;ihp;frs)  = True
correct-state (None;hp;ihp;[])  = True
correct-state (None;hp;ihp;f #fs)  =
let (stk;loc;C ;sig;pc;r) = f in
∃ rt mxs mxl ins s z:
method (;C) sig = Some(C ;rt;mxs;mxl ;ins) ∧  C sig ! pc = Some (s;z) ∧
correct-frame hp ihp s mxl ins f ∧ correct-frames hp ihp  rt sig z r fs ∧
 h hp√ ∧ h-init hp ihp ∧ is-class  C
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